Kant’s Proof of a Universal Principle of Causality:
A Transcendental Idealist’s Reply to Hume
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n his famous dictum, Lord Russell remarked: “The law of
causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no
harm.”1 Russell took the principle of causality to be entirely incoherent, and it‟s no wonder: since Hume, philosophers have
thought of „causality‟ as a metaphysically dubious concept, one
which purports a mysterious necessary connection between an
event A and its respective effect B. Hume‟s momentous critique
of the rationalist principle spawned a contemporary debate, one
which undoubtedly motivated the entire Kantian enterprise, but
one to which Kant also directly contributed in the Second Analogy of the Transcendental Analytic.
In the introduction to the Prolegomena, Kant summarized
Hume‟s accomplishment: “he proved incontrovertibly that it is
entirely impossible for reason to think such a combination a priori
and from concepts, for such a combination contains necessity;
but it absolutely cannot be conceived why, because something is,
some else must also necessarily be, and thus how the concept of
such a connection can be introduced a priori” (4:257). Hume
demonstrated that the rationalist a priori principle of causality is
groundless, for “when we look about us towards external objects,
and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any
quality, which binds the effect to the cause.”2 Causation, for
Hume, has mere inductive status; as such, it is not determinate
and only succeeds in establishing a contingent connection between two events. The occurrence of an event A immediately
and regularly followed by an event B is not an instantiation of
the rationalist notion of necessary connection; rather, the mistaken construal of A and B‟s close arrangement as a necessary
one is a consequence of mere habit of mind brought about by the
constant „conjunction‟ of the two events in experience.3 In short,
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event A does not cause B, but merely precedes it in occasion.
Kant thought that the only way to vindicate any principle
of causality was to abandon attempts to derive its necessity
through experiential grounds; “it must either be grounded completely a priori in the understanding or be entirely abandoned as
a mere chimera” (B123). As Hume demonstrated, the explanatory
efficacy of experience is necessarily limited to the observation of
customary occurrences through which at best I might be able to
affirm that in all formerly observed instances of A, B subsequently follows. Such grounds fall short of what‟s needed, that
is, some grounds through which to derive a necessary law to
which all-future, hitherto unknown, experience must conform. In
recognizing that the objective reality of an a priori principle of
causality can only be established through a priori means, Kant‟s
reply to Hume must therefore be understood as an attempt to
positively establish the concept through an appeal to the understanding, where “the effect is not merely joined to the cause, but
rather is posited through it and results from it” in accordance with
a universal rule (B124).
In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant treats the understanding as the source of a priori concepts, which along with the
forms of intuition, give rise to a priori cognition. Kant derives the
pure concepts of the understanding, or the categories, from twelve
logical functions or forms of judgment. These twelve logical
functions are supposed to serve as „clues‟ to the corresponding
ways in which we form concepts of objects. On the supposition
that the “understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity
entirely measured by these [logical] functions” (B107), Kant derives his Table of Categories: twelve categories for conceiving of
the quantity, quality, relation, and modality of objects (B106).
Kant goes on to argue in the transcendental deduction that all
twelve pure concepts of the understanding apply universally and
necessarily to the objects of experience. His argument here relies
on the “transcendental unity of apperception”: a single unitary
consciousness or continuous string of experiences is possible if
and only if our intuitions, procured through the sensibility, are
synthesized via thought through the categories so as to present us
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with the objects of experience. The application of the categories
to what we might call our „sense-data‟ is a necessary condition
for the representation of the objects of experience. In the second
analogy, the category of interest—derived from the hypothetical
form of judgment—purports to explain causal relations and dependencies (B106) amongst the objects of experience for “only
thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and
not merely of my [own subjective] apprehension, that an
[objective] sequence is to be encountered in it…” (B238).
SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE SUCCESSION
The “Analogies of Experience”, of which the Second
Analogy is a part, concerns the class of categories Kant calls relations. The relational category of causality, once applied to what‟s
given to us in space and time, necessarily grounds “the real upon
which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows” (B183). The argument for causality relies on a distinction
between an objective and a subjective succession of representations, since Kant takes judgments concerning the objective alterations of the states of a substance to be justified if and only if
every objective alteration behaves according to a necessary rule
of succession, viz. causality.
The analogies of experience, broadly speaking, rely on
two assumptions: (i) the unity of apperception and (ii) the application of schematized categories. Again, “the unity of apperception” requires the necessary connection of perceptions and the
synthetic unity of appearances in a single time. This ensures one,
and not many, temporal intervals. The second assumption arises
out of the need to place events along a temporal interval despite
an inability to perceive time in itself. Time understood in abstraction from its phenomenal content tells us that we must pass
through T1 before we reach T2. We cannot experience T1 after or
at the same time as T2. It is through this trivial precept of timerelations that we avoid the contradictory notion of T1 as both present and future. That is, T1 which is prior to T2, cannot be both
simultaneous and subsequent to T2, for “successive periods of
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time constitute a series in which no one period can bear the same
relation to that which precedes and that which follows.”4 Accordingly, objective time-relations are of two sorts: successive and
simultaneous (co-existent). The Second Analogy turns to the successive order of our subjective perceptions and asks whether these
successive perceptions of the states of a substance could have
been ordered differently. To put it more precisely, given that private perceptions of the objects of experience constitute a successive sequence, are there sequences of perceptions such that the
temporal-order is irreversible?
Kant‟s thought is that if the temporal-order of a sequence
of perceptions is irreversible (and certain other conditions hold),
then our objective experience is possible only through the application of an a priori concept of the understanding. In other words,
our experience of objective events presupposes the application of
the causal category. Alternatively, if our apprehension of the
manifold yields a sequence of perceptions such that the temporal
-order is reversible, then in virtue of the reversibility of the subjective succession of representations, we know that no objective
event has occurred. The absence of an objective event implies an
indeterminate, wholly subjective temporal-order. An object that
is not successive in itself is apprehended in some unique temporal order merely because our apprehension of the manifold of
appearances is always successive (B234). In the absence of an objective event, we know that the states of the substance itself are co
-existent; though our perceptions of it might occur in some other
temporal order, such an order is contingent upon our assorted
perceptual freedoms, e.g. scanning left-to-right, right-to-left, topto-bottom, and not determined by succession in the object itself.
“Thus, e.g., the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house that stands before me is successive. Now the
question is whether the manifold of this house itself is also successive, which certainly no one will concede” (B235). Let‟s call
our perception of the roof of a house AR and our perception of
the doorway BR, and let‟s assume that AR and BR are independently perceptible. The house is meant to exemplify an object in
which A and B do not succeed one another. Rather, they are co-
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existent since it is possible to experience either AR or BR prior to
the other. AR and BR possess what Strawson calls “orderindifference”5, in view of the fact that [ARBR]-irreversibility does
not hold. To use Beck‟s terminology6, [ARBR] does not imply the
objective event [AB], which symbolizes a state A in an object
which precedes a state B in an object. Nothing has happened; no
objective event has occurred; no state has come to be in a substance that formerly was not (B237).
Kant contrasts this sequence of successive perceptions of
a house, which does not constitute an objective event (given that
the manifold is not apprehended in a necessary order), with successive perceptions of a ship driven downstream. A moving ship
is meant to serve as an obvious example of a sequence of successive perceptions that lacks “order-indifference”, and hence constitutes an objective event. “My perception of its position downstream follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is
impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship
should first be perceived downstream and afterwards upstream” (B237). The subject‟s various perceptual freedoms, e.g.
scanning left-to-right, right-to-left, top-to-bottom, etc., have no
bearing on the temporal-order of the successive perceptions—the
order is objectively determined. Let‟s call our perception of the
ship upstream AR and our perception of the ship downstream BR.
As a result of the successiveness of the object itself, it is not possible to view BR prior to AR, all subjects necessarily apprehend AR
prior to BR, i.e. [ARBR]-irreversibility holds. Apprehension is
“bound to” the order of the sequence of perceptions.
Causality figures into Kant‟s objective-subjective distinction through the claim that a subject‟s conception of an objective
event, i.e. [AB], necessitates or presupposes the application of a
causal principle to the relevant objects of perception. In the absence of such a principle, we‟d lack the ability to Comprehend a
determinate, necessary temporal-ordering. The successive perceptions of an objective event are necessarily connected according
to a rule (B238). For otherwise, “if one were to suppose that nothing preceded an occurrence that it must follow in accordance
with a rule, then all sequence of perception would be determined
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solely in apprehension, i.e., merely subjectively, but it would not
thereby be objectively determined which of the perceptions must
be the preceding one and which the succeeding one” (B239).
Again, Kant‟s argument relies on a crucial objectivesubjective distinction, since an irreversible sequence of perceptions would require that one perception succeed another in the
object of experience and not merely in the subject‟s apprehension
of the manifold of appearances. Conceived in this manner, objectivity is effectively a form of inter-subjectivity: any subject must
apprehend such an irreversible sequence of perceptions in a determinate order. The understanding, according to the universal
law of cause and effect, imputes a temporal order to phenomena
by attributing to each phenomenon a place in a temporal interval
in relation to antecedent and subsequent phenomenon. In the
Transcendental Deduction Kant established that we must employ concepts of objects in order to have objective experience.
Here, in the Second Analogy, Kant affirms that “[we] render
[our] subjective synthesis of apprehension objective only by reference to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in
their succession, that is, as they happen, are determined by the
preceding state” (B240).
A NON SEQUITUR OF NUMBING GROSSNESS
In the classic, The Bounds of Sense, P.F. Strawson famously
assessed the merits of Kant‟s argument: “the order of perceptions
is characterized not only as necessary, but as a determined order,
an order in which our apprehension is bound down, or which we
are compelled to observe. These may all perhaps be admitted as
legitimate ways of expressing the denial of order-indifference.
But from this point the argument proceeds by a non sequitur of
numbing grossness.”7
As Strawson recognized, [ARBR]irreversibility does not imply [AB]-irreversibility, since this
would require an A-type state of substance to necessarily give
way to a B-type state of substance. No such necessity has been
established. We cannot infer from the irreversibility of perceptions of the states of a substance, the irreversibility of the objects
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themselves. Thus, what Lovejoy similarly deemed to be “one of
the most spectacular examples of the non sequitur…to be found in
the history of philosophy”8 is as follows:
1. [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB]
2. [AB] → [AB]-irreversibility
3. Therefore, [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB]-irreversibility
Strawson‟s charge denies the validity of (1) and a fortiori
the validity of (2), which together amount to the implausible
claim that [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB]-irreversibility. The non
sequitur is rooted in Kant‟s failure account for two conditions that
must be satisfied if [ARBR]-irreversibility is to imply [AB]irreversibility. The first of these must be satisfied in order to
know simply whether an objective event has occurred. Recall
Kant‟s example of the house, where AR (the roof) co-exists with
BR (the doorway). The principle of opposites or contraries, a
metaphysical offshoot of the principle of non-contradiction, implies that incompatible conditions cannot co-exist. A static state
of substance cannot logically suffer contrary things at the same
time in the same part of itself.9 A house‟s roof and doorway certainly are not incompatible states of a substance, and as such,
they are co-existent. Alternatively, Kant‟s example of a boat being driven downstream satisfies the non-coexistence condition as
it cannot be both upstream and downstream (at the same time) in
relation to some point along the river. Hereinafter, [AB] symbolizes an objective event, i.e. an objective succession in the substance itself; [ARBR] symbolizes our subjective representations of
the states of substance. This notation is borrowed from Lewis
White Beck (see references). Therefore, at the very least, we
know that the movement of the boat constitutes an objective
event, but this does not tell us whether [AB] or [BA] occurs. If we
suppose non-coexistence, premise (1) should be reformulated as:
i. [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB] or [BA] (given noncoexistence)
To know that [AB] and not-[BA] has occurred, we must
know that perceptual isomorphism, i.e. “the condition that there
be no relevant difference in the modes of causal dependence of
AR on A and BR on B” holds. Perceptual isomorphism requires
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that the causal process that connects A with its perceptual effect
AR occur prior to the causal process that connects B with its perceptual effect BR. There are a number of ways perceptual isomorphism can fail to hold. “A cunning arrangement of mirrors, designed to reflect some of the light over large distances before it
reached my eyes might ensure that I saw later events before the
earlier.”10 Or, to give a more concrete example, given that light
travels faster than sound, we might see Cornell University‟s
McGraw clock tower strike midnight before we hear its bells
chime despite the fact that McGraw strikes one and its bells begin to ring at exactly the same time, i.e. midnight. Nonetheless, if
this condition holds, AR will necessarily precede BR, that is, the
objective event [AB] will compel us to observe AR & BR in one
and only one order, viz., [ARBR]. Therefore:
ii.
[AB]→[ARBR]-irreversibility (given perceptual isomorphism)
In light of (i) and (ii), Kant‟s causal schema, i.e. [AB]irreversibility, derived in premise (3) is valid if and only if we
know that A and B are not co-existent and perceptual isomorphism holds. If we know non-coexistence, as we do in Kant‟s
own boat example, the crux of Strawson objection has to do with
the invalid move from the plausible objective temporal claim that
B succeeds A in the object, i.e. [AB], to the objective casual
schema, i.e. [AB]-irreversibility, which makes the stronger claim
that A never succeeds B in the object, i.e. never-[BA]. To make the
move from (1) to (2), we must know or have sufficient reason to
believe that perceptual isomorphism holds, but to know this, we
must know or have sufficient reason to believe [AB]irreversibility. Alas, this is the very causal schema Kant is seeking!
LEWIS WHITE BECK:
SAVIOR OF THE SECOND ANALOGY?
Now, there are some who would like to save Kant from Strawson
by claiming that a general causal law is the only thing that could
ground objective succession—they try to avoid the non sequitur
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by avoiding appeals to particular causal laws. They argue that
Kant is setting out to establish a universal principle of causality,
a principle he treats as distinct from any empirical instantiations
that might ground a causal connection between a particular A
and a particular B. Although Kant‟s proof aims to provide the a
priori basis for the relationship between successive objective
states of substance, he says nothing about any particular causal
law or what might constitute a proper antecedent condition. As
he puts it himself, “there are thus certain laws, in fact a priori
laws, that first make a nature possible. Empirical laws can obtain,
and be discovered, only by means of experience, and indeed in
virtue of these original laws through which experience itself first
becomes possible” (B263).
Though while a transcendental principle of the understanding is established entirely independent of all experience,
particular casual laws are not solely derived through empirical
means, since they are “grounded in or made possible by [a] transcendental principle of the understanding.”11 Hence, a defense
against the classical charge of non sequitur that relies on a strong
distinction between the transcendental principle and its empirical instantiations is unavailable. A particular causal law is necessarily subsumed under the transcendental principal, consequently, the separation is not sufficiently strong; the two are not
logically exclusive, as they must be, if the proof is to survive
Strawson‟s charge. It therefore seems that we must look elsewhere for an adequate defense of Kant.
If Strawson is correct to interpret Kant to infer as he takes
him to infer, then the charge of non sequitur is fitting. There‟s no
doubt that simply inferring [AB]-irreversibility from [ARBR]irreversibility would qualify as a non sequitur, but as Lewis White
Beck argues in his defense of Kant‟s proof, this is not Kant‟s inference. In a short essay, entitled A Non Sequitur of Numbing
Grossness?, Beck interprets Kant as follows12:
1. [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB]-irreversibility if and
only if (i) A and B are not coexistent and (ii) perceptual
isomorphism does not fail.
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2. To know [AB], given [ARBR]-irreversibility, requires:
(i) knowledge that A & B are opposite states of a substance; and (ii) knowledge of [AB]- irreversibility to
ensure that perceptual isomorphism does not fail.
3. Knowledge of 3(i) is sufficient to know that A & B
are not coexistent, i.e. there is an objective event, but
knowledge of 3(i) is not sufficient to know whether
[AB] or [BA] has occurred.
4. In virtue of Hume‟s conception of causality, I can
know that [AB] occurs.
5. If I know [AB], then I know not-[BA], which implies
knowledge of [AB]-irreversibility.
6. Given knowledge of [AB]-irreversibility, I know perceptual isomorphism does not fail in virtue of 3(ii).
7. [AB]-irreversibility is the schema of causation
8. Therefore, to know that [AB] occurs, I must know
that A contains the casual condition of B.
Beck‟s interpretation, in contrast to Strawson‟s, differs in that
premise (2) attributes to Kant‟s proof recognition of the two conditions outlined above. Beck takes Kant to acknowledge these
conditions at B234: “The objective relation of appearances [that
is, of A and B] that follow upon one another is not to be determined through mere perception [that is, from the sequential relation of AR & BR].”13
However, one might be skeptical of Beck‟s defense. Premise (4), in particular, seems problematic, since to know perceptual
isomorphism holds, I must know [AB] irreversibility, but to
know this, I must know that [AB] and not-[BA] has occurred.
But, can I know [AB] has occurred from mere experience? It appears, at first glance, that Beck is begging the question, since all
that experience can offer is knowledge of [ARBR]. And this would
be a valid objection to Beck as Kant is not entitled to (4) insofar as
his argument is a general proof of the universal principle of causality. But as Beck points out, insofar as the Second Analogy is
meant to serve as a reply to Hume, Kant is entitled to claim he
knows [AB] occurred, “for Hume knows [AB] but has skeptical
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doubts about [AB]-necessarily.”14 Meaning, if we‟re to grant Kant
knowledge of [AB], then perceptual isomorphism holds, thereby
yielding sufficient grounds for inferring from [ARBR]irreversibility that [AB]-irreversibly occurs. If we treat the Second Analogy as a direct reply to Hume, in which case Kant can
make use of Hume‟s own assumptions, Beck would have us believe that Strawson‟s charge is misplaced.
But what did Hume mean when he said that we can know
[AB]? In anticipation of Kant‟s later analytic/synthetic distinction, Hume maintained a two-pronged conception of reason,
where on the one hand, it served to discover the pure relations
between ideas, while on the other, it served to discover matters
of fact in sensory experience.15 Hume‟s epistemic criteria therefore says that statements of relations of ideas are „either intuitively or demonstratively certain‟, where by „certain‟ Hume
means that we are justified „by the mere operation of thought‟ in
not questioning a statement‟s truth.16 Statement‟s about matters
of fact, on the other hand, depend on evidence gained through
experience. Accordingly, Hume rejects „obscure and uncertain‟17
metaphysical concepts such as power, force, or necessary connection, since they don‟t fall under either function of reason:
Let an object be presented to a man of ever so
strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be
entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most
accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects.18
So, then, how can we know or have sufficient reason to believe
that [AB] occurs within the Humean architectonic? To believe,
says Hume, is simply to judge a proposition to be true. Causal
inference is simply the product of belief in cause-effect relations:
Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible,
firm, steady conception of an object, than what the
imagination is ever able to attain. This variety of
terms, which may seems so unphilosophical, is in-
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tended only to express that act of mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions.19
And so, while our causal inferences are not justified, we nonetheless come to believe them, and some cases, even come to know
them. Once Kant knows [AB] has occurred and not [BA], he can
then justifiably know [AB]-irreversibility occurs. By falling back
on his grand doctrine of transcendental idealism, it then follows
that A must contain the causal conditions of B, for otherwise
Kant would argue, there‟d be no grounds in the understanding
for experiencing the objective event [AB]-irreversibly. To know
any such objective event necessitates the application of causal
category, since the effect, i.e. B, is joined to the cause, i.e. A, in
our understanding by thinking through the causal category.
But, one is now stricken by the utter dependence of the
second analogy on Kant‟s underlying doctrine of transcendental
idealism. If Kant intends for [AB]-irreversibility to serve as the
causal schema, then it can only do so if we presuppose Kant‟s
conception of the world of appearances as given to us in the sensibility and brought under the categories. For otherwise, we‟d
have yet another whopping non sequitur: it doesn‟t follow from
Kant‟s premises in the second analogy that we must apply the
pure concepts of the understanding to the manifold of appearances. We needn‟t, at least not in virtue of Kant‟s objective/
subjective distinction, posit a causal law. We might very well
posit some other doctrine to account for irreversible objective
succession in objects. We might be sympathizers of the early Cartesian, Nicholas Malebranche, whereby we account for irreversible objective succession by attributing it to God‟s will. If we obtain ideas of external things by viewing them within God himself, then there‟s no need (nor are we justified) to treat [AB]irreversibility as the causal schema. Again, if we abandon the
force of transcendental idealism, Kant‟s reply to Hume fails. To
establish the principle of causality, we must read the second
analogy through a transcendental idealist‟s spectacles, since once
removed a Malebranchian theory will do just as well. Kant, of
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course, wouldn‟t have it any other way.
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